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Germany welcomed over a million refugees following the so-called ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015. Today, 
however, seeking asylum in Germany has become ever more difficult. Amongst other ‘undeserving’ economic 
refugees, the Afghans and Pakistanis are suffering from a shift in the German asylum regime that aims to restrict 
migration from ‘safe countries.’ As elsewhere in Europe, asylum in Germany is increasingly being defined by 
narrow ideas of deservingness and humanitarianism to seek out ‘deserving’ political refugees. Simultaneously, 
two methods for the removal of rejected asylum seekers are being practised to deter ‘undeserving’ refugees: 
namely, deportations and ‘voluntary’ returns. Focusing on the latter form of removal, I scrutinize the 
voluntariness and sustainability of ‘voluntary’ returns to Pakistan in this essay. I start by questioning 
contemporary ideas of deservingness when it comes to the right to be mobile, and provocatively try to blur the 
alleged humanitarian division between two categories of mobile bodies: the ‘deserving’ political refugee vis-à-
vis the ‘underserving’ economic refugee. Then, with the help of ethnographic material from my ongoing 
research and three measures or scales of assessment (choice, information and assistance), I take a critical look 
at ‘voluntary’ returns from Germany. In doing so, I discuss the sustainability and ethics of inducing return 
through such modes of repatriation to Pakistan. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Two legalised forms of expulsion are at the 
disposal of any government that wants to send 
back displaced populations, irregular migrants 
or other illegalised ‘undesirables’ (Agier 2011) 
to ‘safe countries.’ Namely, deportations and 
‘voluntary’ returns. The discourse on 
deportations in Germany is fraught with 
controversy for various contemporary but also 
                                                 
1 This paper is an outcome of ongoing anthropological fieldwork for a DFG-Funded research project ‘Return to Pakistan: 
The Political Economy of the Emotions of Remigration’ at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Ludwig 
Maximilian University of Munich. I would like to thank Clara Cornaro, Desiree Hetzel and Martin Sökefeld for their 
valuable input. In addition to Martin’s constructive feedback and review of this paper, I am grateful for his constant support 
and supervision. 
specific historical reasons –– the German word 
for deportation (Abschiebung) comes with 
particular historical baggage (Estrin 2016, 
Sökefeld 2019b, Stokes 2019). With this in 
mind, as well as the fact that there is ample 
work addressing the issue of deportations in 
Germany and elsewhere (see De Genova and 
Peutz 2010, De Genova 2016b, see Peutz 2006,
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Sökefeld 2019b), this paper will not address 
this particular form of removal. Instead, the 
body of text that follows will be focusing on the 
‘voluntary’ returns of rejected asylum seekers. 
Various socio-political reasons, some of them 
defensible but most of them based on 
unfounded claims2, have led the European 
Union (EU), and Germany in particular, to take 
various steps towards ‘migration management’ 
and border control (Anderson 2019, De Genova 
2016a). These steps include an array of arsenal 
to guard ‘Fortress Europe’, from the 
securitisation of its physical borders to 
questionable deterrence techniques employed 
in the countries of origin and transit (Anderson 
2014, Meany 2019). Concurrently, based on 
particular ideas of ‘deservingness’ stricter 
measures are being taken to control, manage 
and if necessary remove3 those who have 
somehow made it into Europe (Sökefeld 2019b, 
a). In the policy quarters of Europe and beyond, 
it is being argued that Europe needs protection 
against exploitation at the hands of ‘bogus’ 
asylum seekers and economic refugees. A clear 
difference, it is asserted, needs to be drawn 
between a genuine refugee (henceforth 
political refugee) and a chancer migrant 
(henceforth economic refugee) so that the 
limited capacity to dish out compassion can be 
effectively employed. Such a vision and form 
of humanitarianism seems to fuel our collective 
apathy, even antipathy towards ‘bogus’ asylum 
seekers, irregular migrants and undocumented 
citizens today –– epitomised in the old German 
term ‘Wirtschaftsflüchtling’ [economic 
refugee] (Stokes 2019).  
                                                 
2 The rhetoric of the alt-right and ultranationalist parties 
blaming foreigners for the exploitation of state support 
and for stealing jobs are amongst other unfounded 
claims. 
3 As mentioned above, through deportation or various 
forms of ‘voluntary’ remigration/return, sometimes also 
An ever-narrowing understanding of a 
victimised ‘deserving’ political refugee and an 
ever-expanding idea of an exploitative 
(‘undeserving’) economic refugee are 
simultaneously defining the difference and 
vision mentioned above. Somewhat 
provocatively, however, I would like to blur the 
distinction between the political and the 
economic. Instead of seeing the two through the 
humanitarian lens, I argue for the treatment of 
the two categories of people through the lens of 
social responsibility. It should be quickly 
pointed out that in no way whatsoever does this 
argument aim to reduce the suffering of a 
person –– a refugee –– who flees a war, 
political and religious persecution or any acute 
form of violence (Galtung and Fisher 2013). 
Nevertheless, some profound questions need to 
be reflected upon. Should ideas of 
deservingness4 be predicated on forms of 
violence and suffering and be evaluated 
according to the generalised situation of the 
country of origin? Where does our collective 
responsibility start and end? Should we, for 
example, differentiate between someone who 
flees from war or acute violence fearing for 
their life and someone who fears for their life 
due to economic or structural violence (Farmer 
2006, Galtung and Fisher 2013) as far as the 
right to asylum is concerned? While it is 
reasonably easy to furnish a yes to such a 
question based upon utilitarian5 ideas of pain 
and suffering, it is perhaps easier to argue for a 
no using the Kantian notion of the categorical 
imperative (Driver 2014, Rohlf 2018). 
In reality, however, such questions rarely 
make it outside the classrooms of moral 
known as assisted voluntary return/repatriation or ‘self-
deportation’.  
4 As dictated by our current regimes of (im)mobility and 
humanitarian vision and blinded by methodological 
nationalism.  
5 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill would certainly 
back such a stance (Driver 2014).  
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philosophy, and political realism seems to be in 
control when it comes to the topic of migration 
or refugees. Sökefeld (2019b) for example, 
shows us how the ‘politics of deportation’ in 
Germany point out to the thinly veiled attempt 
at curtailing extreme right-wing support. 
Parties like Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
have gained considerable electoral ground by 
positioning themselves in radical opposition to 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)’s so-
called ‘open door policy’ towards refugees and 
‘economic migrants’. Epitomised by the 
willkommenskultur [welcome culture] attitude 
and Kein mensch ist illegal [No human is 
illegal] movement the German centrist parties 
feel that their hospitality towards the alien-
other may be alienating people at home. The 
solution seems to lie in the strict differentiation 
between the economic migrant and the refugee 
based on ideas of deservingness and 
humanitarianism. It is worth mentioning that 
this is a trend that is not unique to the politics 
of mobility and migration in Germany but 
resonates with the refugee politics of western 
Europe since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. 
Germany is, however, unique in the sense that 
it has been in a ‘permanent state of refugee 
crisis’ as noted by the historian Lauren Stokes 
(2019). In a recent article Stokes (2019) traces 
the roots of the current politics of deportations 
in Germany as far back as the 1950s and 60s. 
He (ibid) recounts how in 1965 four hundred 
people were deported from the Zirndorf camp 
near Nuremberg on account of being ‘economic 
refugees’. In the preceding years, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) had decided to 
allow and even encourage people from the 
socialist East to apply for asylum in order to 
access the labour market in Germany. 
However, when people were able to acquire a 
work permit to move out of refugee camps with 
relative ease, several experts started to raise 
questions about the asylum procedure. Stokes 
(ibid, 33) quotes the Bavarian Interior 
Ministry’s ‘foreigner expert’ Werner Kanein 
who at the time complained that the refugee 
camp had become ‘a central employment 
agency for citizens of certain states, and the 
filing of an application for asylum only a 
necessary formal requirement’. While the 
Bavarian Interior Ministry was worried that 
refugee camps had become ‘labour recruitment 
agencies’ (ibid) the neighbours of the Zirndorf 
camp saw its inhabitants not as a pool of labour 
but as unwanted criminals in their town. Stokes 
(ibid) notes that the term ‘economic refugee’ 
appears to have developed around this time. 
With such competing political interests in and 
demands from the refugee, the development of 
a new category was inevitable.  
 
‘Voluntary’ returns: the role of 
deservingness and deportability  
Today, the ideal migrant should be someone 
who offers excellent human capital to the host 
nation. Nikesh Shukla (2016) claims that in 
practice the demand to be a ‘good migrant’ is 
even more extreme –– which only an 
outstanding athlete, a scientific savant or an 
artistic prodigy can fulfil. In such times, a 
refugee not only gets the short end of the stick 
but seems to be stuck in a paradox. On the one 
hand, he/she should be able to scarcely function 
to even claim asylum (see Ticktin 2011). On the 
other hand, he/she should be ready and eager to 
integrate and not become a burden on the 
state’s welfare system. If a person tries to act 
out of self-interest or employ their human 
capital, chances are they will be marked as an 
economic refugee, or someone who ‘deceitfully 
tries to blur the distinction between the political 
and the economic out of self-interest’ (Meany 
2019). However, if a person is not able to learn 
the local language or not able to quit social 
welfare, then they are not trying hard enough to 
integrate.    Apart    from    drawing    a    strict 
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differentiation between the ‘deserving’ 
refugee6 and the ‘undeserving’ economic 
migrant/refugee7 the state simultaneously 
places one’s efforts to integrate as a caveat (for 
a detailed discussion on deserving/undeserving 
see Sökefeld 2019b).  
When faced with such a predicament an 
asylum seeker is bound to think and act out of 
insecurity. Here, drawing upon Nicholas De 
Genova’s (2002, 439) idea of ‘deportability’ I 
argue that the possibility of deportation is not 
the only source of insecurity and anxiety, so is 
one’s ubiquitous chance of being considered an 
‘undeserving’8 refugee. This insecurity as such 
is not only a legal worry but something that 
continually affects a refugee’s subjectivity. 
Whereby an existential fear dictates their 
actions, choices and decisions in the host 
country. As such, deportability in the broadest 
sense of the word is used here to ask the 
following question: Why is the German state 
resorting to a strict division between 
the political and the economic, bringing an 
ever-increasing number of people into the fold 
of deportability?  
In his essay Nations Rebound, Sökefeld 
(2019b) points out that the very process of 
limiting the movement of particular foreign 
bodies and not others is a way to re-
territorialise and rebind nations, ironically, to 
counter the re-emergence of right-wing 
nationalism. Seemingly, challenges by right-
wing nationalists can be nipped in the bud by 
this logical differentiation between the political 
and the economic refugee9. However, Sökefeld 
                                                 
6 Someone who is worthy of humanitarian aid and refuge. 
7 Someone who is seen as exploiting and undermining 
those very humanitarian values. 
8 For Pakistanis in Germany being considered a 
deserving refugee is largely based on hope; hopes of a 
better future that rests on the shoulders of the 
‘humanitarian’ German state. Most of my interlocutor’s 
talked about the ‘insaniyat’ [humanity, human kindness] 
in Germany. They presented me with anecdotal 
examples, comparing Germany to Pakistan where ‘koi 
(ibid, 94) asserts that ‘a neat analytical 
distinction between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ 
is as impossible as is the distinction between 
deportation and [voluntary] remigration’. If 
deportation and ‘voluntary’ return cannot be 
neatly separated into two distinct categories, it 
would make sense to question the voluntariness 
of ‘voluntary’ returns. While political and 
social activists regularly challenge deportations 
on various grounds10, ‘voluntary’ returns seem 
to be accepted on face value and go mostly 
unchallenged. In that vein, this essay tries to 
problematise the issue of ‘voluntary’ returns in 
Germany. Moreover, it challenges some of the 
uncritically accepted tenants of such a return to 
one’s country of origin. 
 
‘Voluntary returns: a better alternative to 
deportations? 
Apart from being considered more ethical to 
deportations and politically less divisive, there 
is an important economic aspect for the 
propagation of ‘voluntary’ return programs 
(Schuler and Zacharakis 2016). Deportation 
infrastructure and processes have cost 
Germany millions over the last few years 
(Bundestagdrucksache 2019, Macgregor 2019, 
Schuler and Zacharakis 2016, Vettori 2019). A 
single deportation can result in costing tens of 
thousands of euros in transportation alone. On 
the 31st of July 2018, for example, a chartered 
flight carrying only eight Pakistani deportees 
and fifty members of the security personnel 
cost Germany €462,685 (Bundestagdrucksache 
2019, 48). At the cost of around €60,000 per 
insaniyat nahi’ [there is no humanity] (see the section 
‘Three Returnees’ in this paper).  
9 Sökefeld (2019b) uses the term migrant while I use the 
term economic refugee.  
10 It is worth mentioning here that more and more 
deportations are only challenged based on ideas of 
‘deservingness’ and integration efforts of the refugee 
rather than a principled stance one’s right to refuge or 
better yet to be mobile (Gerver 2018, Peutz 2006, 
Sökefeld 2019b). 
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deportee this particular flight was relatively 
expensive, although even the cheapest charted 
flight to Pakistan cost the German state around 
€10,000 per deportee in 2018  (ibid., 2019, 48-
50). In addition to the transportation costs, one 
must consider the fee of hiring security 
personnel, the bureaucratic expenses, the 
policing, the apprehension and detention before 
deportation, not to mention the cost of all the 
unsuccessful arrests. Deportees are flown back 
on chartered flights due to practical and 
political reasons11. Since pilots and crew on 
such chartered flights refuse to fly without 
security, each deportee12 is accompanied by a 
minimum of three members of the security 
personnel, adding considerable transportation 
costs. In comparison, a ‘voluntary’ return 
compensation13 –– or reintegration 
support/payment as it is called –– ranges from 
a few hundred euros to a couple of thousand, 
and an economy class airfare on a commercial 
airline. 
There is no doubt that ‘voluntary’ returns 
are cheaper and politically less divisive as 
compared to deportations, however, whether 
they are voluntary is a lot less clear (Mahar 
2020a). We know that the ethics of deportation 
are routinely (and rightly) questioned based on 
ideas of human agency and freedom to move. 
Sökefeld (2019a) for example, brings into 
question ideas of choice, will and agency when 
he questions whether a ‘deportation is a form of 
forced migration?’ Should we not hold all 
forms of return migration –– forced or 
voluntary –– accountable to the same 
standards? On its surface, the term voluntary 
takes care of such doubts in the case of 
‘voluntary’ returns. However, reflecting on the 
assumed voluntariness is not only essential to a 
                                                 
11 Apart from the visibility of resistance on the part of the 
deportee (which had led many passengers to boycott 
certain airlines), a furtive flight avoids staged protests 
and activist interruptions.  
critical understanding of ‘voluntary’ returns but 
also necessary for this form of repatriation to 
sustainably function.  
 
The research material and methods  
Before proceeding further to what a ‘voluntary’ 
return entails –– as far as the subjects of these 
returns are concerned –– it would make sense 
to address some methodological concerns. In 
the absence of an anthropological ‘field site’ in 
the traditional sense of the word, multi-sited 
ethnographic fieldwork was carried out around 
Munich, Germany and various parts of Punjab, 
Pakistan. Returnees at different (pre- and post-
repatriation) stages of the repatriation process 
were sought after as interlocutors. Other 
important research partners included 
individuals and organisations that manage and 
administer ‘voluntary’ return programs such as, 
but not only, return counsellors in Germany and 
reintegration partners in Pakistan. 
A mixed-method ethnographic approach 
was adopted. In addition to a detailed recording 
of behaviours, witnessing of events and sharing 
of experiences through participant observation, 
the ongoing research has already recorded 
several hours of qualitative interviews with 
returnees and return counsellors over a six-
month period. The gathered research material is 
further augmented by several semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups. This included but 
was not limited to: (1) Listening to the 
experiences, hopes and aspirations of Pakistani 
asylum seekers in different settings (in refugee 
camps as well as return counselling centres); 
(2) listening to return counsellors and 
discussing ‘voluntary’ return with them at 
public forums; (3) spending several days with
12 The deportee is already in handcuffs that are 
sometimes chained to his/her ankles.  
13 Below I have given some concrete figures.  
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returnees and their families at their homes in 
Pakistan talking about their return and 
reintegration. Through the use of this material 
and of three case studies, this essay tries to 
unpack ‘voluntary’ return as a mode of 
migration management (Anderson 2014, De 
Genova 2016a).  
 
Three returnees 
Ali R. 
After spending four years in Germany, Ali R. 
recently returned to Pakistan at the age of 55, 
assisted by a voluntary return counselling 
centre in Munich. Ali received a letter of 
deportation once his application for asylum and 
the subsequent appeal was rejected. However, 
around the same time, Ali had a bicycle 
accident and had to go through surgery. Owing 
to his medical condition Ali was allowed to stay 
in Germany for another year. Once he had 
healed and saw no prospect of getting legalised, 
he approached Coming Home, a return 
counselling centre in Munich. At Coming 
Home, he was promised around €1500 in 
addition to in-kind assistance of €200014 and a 
flight ticket to Pakistan. Ali accepted and 
returned to Pakistan within a month.  
He is more or less content with how things 
developed for him. In his hometown of Mandi 
Bahauddin, Ali shared with me in great detail 
why he would never be able to forget the 
German ‘mehman nawazi’ [hospitality] and 
‘insaniyat’ [humanity]. Expanding on this, he 
explained how he was given a place to stay and 
a stipend by the Germans. Talking about his 
accident, he said that even though his asylum 
was rejected, they made sure he was healthy 
and fit to return –– ‘wadia log ne’ [they 
[Germans] are amazing people] he added. 
Whereas in Pakistan he had worked for 
decades, but he could not even ensure a decent 
living for his family. He explained how he was 
                                                 
14 And another €1000 after eight months of his return. 
able to build a modest house, get his daughter 
married and is now busy setting up a small 
corner shop –– all with his European savings 
plus the return assistance.  
 
Jamshed B.  
Jamshed B. was ‘advised’ by his district 
administrative office (Landsratamt) handler to 
visit the same return counselling centre in 
Munich. Sharing in detail how little agency he 
had in this process, Jamshed explained how it 
was more an ultimatum than an advice. As 
such, the ‘instruction’ to visit the return 
counselling centre was the only option 
available to him upon the rejection of his 
asylum application and his multiple appeals. If 
he did not want to be deported or take the risk 
of becoming an absconder by leaving for 
another country, he should have returned 
through a ‘voluntary’ return program- he was 
‘advised’. Jamshed was told if he tried to leave 
for Spain (his second choice after Germany) he 
would be apprehended and returned to 
Germany where he would face prison as 
punishment and then deportation. According to 
Jamshed, only a ‘sach bolne wala’ [someone 
who speaks the truth] and ‘kanoon ki pasdari 
kerne wala’ [someone who abides by the law] 
would return through a ‘voluntary’ return 
program. While the rest, according to him, find 
various ways to cheat the system.  
He repeatedly emphasised that he would 
have never returned was he presented with a 
real choice. However, with deportation 
looming over his head, he had no other option. 
He confided to me that he will be leaving for 
Dubai soon because it was not safe for him to 
stay in his village as an ex-leader of a Shia 
youth-group. He said he would have moved to 
another part of Pakistan, a bigger city perhaps, 
only if he had the resources to move his family. 
He, along with his wife and children currently 
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live at his in-laws, something which is 
considered to be a source of shame in Pakistani 
society. Jamshed’s failed migration to 
Germany and the current effort to move to 
Dubai is a way to find a solution to get rid of 
this shame and as well as the sectarian troubles. 
Jamshed, unlike Ali, regrets coming back.  
Jamshed was very clear that he did not trust 
the Afghan translator yet he had no choice but 
to go through the process. Moreover, neither 
did he see the return counsellors as people who 
cared about his ‘razamandi’ [consent]15 and 
‘marzi’ [[one’s own] accord]. Speaking about 
‘voluntary’ return subjects in general Jamshed 
said: ‘Wouldn’t they have tried to help us stay 
in Germany if they cared about our consent […] 
they only wanted us to leave and we had little 
choice in that […] if there would have been 
consent, I would not have returned…’  
 
Hassam. A. 
One of my other interlocutors withdrew his 
asylum appeal before it was processed, in order 
to return through the same program. Hassam 
A., like Jamshed, regrets returning to Pakistan 
and holds social and psychological pressures 
responsible. These were exacerbated by his 
father’s death –– forcing him to take the 
somewhat risky decision to return to his village 
in Azad Kashmir16. He came back with no 
savings and has yet to receive the money that 
was promised to him a year ago.  
According to one of his friends –– a 
German volunteer who had taken upon himself 
to help the twenty or so Pakistani asylum 
seekers in his village of Bad Tölz –– Hassam 
had integrated quite well during his time in 
Germany. However, it seems that Hassam 
could not cope with the pressure and 
precariousness of waiting and the possibility of 
rejection. In other words, he was not sure if he 
                                                 
15 ‘Wilful agreement'–– from 'razi’ [to agree].  
would be included into the category of the 
‘deserving’ (a question that his ill father had 
often asked). When his father passed away, he 
broke the chain of insecurity (and deportability) 
by forfeiting his asylum appeal and 
‘voluntarily’ returning. 
 
‘Voluntary’ returns: assessing voluntariness 
and sustainability 
By taking into consideration return counsellors, 
facilitators and subjects or so-called ‘clients’, 
this section will focus on the methods and 
practices of ‘voluntary’ return programs to 
determine its sustainability as a mode of 
repatriation. Taking a critical look at some of 
these practices, voluntariness and sustainability 
of such returns is put into question. This section 
starts by introducing three complex and 
important situations that return facilitators, 
counsellors and especially returnees face, by 
placing them on three different scales that I 
have developed. I have termed these scales as 
follows (1) The Choice Scale; (2) The 
Information Scale; and (3) The Assistance 
Scale.  
First and foremost, it is argued that the 
three scales offer us means to respectively 
evaluate the role of coercion, information and 
assistance in ‘voluntary’ return. At a secondary 
level, I argue that these situations and their 
respective scales can help third party observers 
and host countries determine the voluntariness 
of ‘voluntary’ return subjects and hence the 
sustainability of ‘voluntary’ return 
programmes. Furthermore, these scales can 
help address legitimate ethical concerns around 
such forms of repatriation. Throughout the 
course of the text, I draw upon examples and 
material from my ethnographic fieldwork and 
in particular to the three cases or stories of 
‘voluntary’ return mentioned above to address
16 A region which is roughly thirty kilometres from the 
Line of Control between India and Pakistan.  
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each of these scales in detail. The concerns 
brought to the table will not only help in a better 
understanding of ‘voluntary’ return as a form of 
repatriation but also show how it affects various 
stakeholders –– from the client (the subject of 
return) to the counsellor. 
 
Scales of voluntariness  
1. The Choice Scale 
While return counsellors and facilitators17 are 
supposed to only advise and assist, they 
become at times (willingly or unwillingly) part 
of a system –– or, a mobility regime–– which 
wants particular asylum seekers and refugees to 
re-emigrate to their country of origin. This call 
to remigration is often based on a very limited 
understanding18 of human suffering, 
deservingness and one’s right to be mobile. 
When harsh conditions and policies (Christides 
et al. 2020, Sökefeld 2019a) make the lives of 
asylum seekers difficult in the host country and 
lead people to return to their country of origin 
through ‘voluntary’ return, how can we 
distinguish choice from coercion? If the 
decision to return is made out of free 
will/choice, there should be no coercion on the 
part of the returning state. If living in a state of 
insecurity and deportability (De Genova 2002) 
is a structural part of the refugee condition and 
a source of humiliation, social isolation and 
other forms of unfreedom, then it can be argued 
that the decision to return cannot be based on 
choice but rather coercion (Mahar 2020a). By 
removing such pressures as much as possible, 
policymakers in host nations like Germany are 
able to ensure that what counsellors are 
providing is only objective advice, and the 
returnee’s decision to return is informed mainly 
by free will and choice. 
                                                 
17 In Germany, Pakistan or elsewhere.  
18 See discussions above on deserving/undeserving, 
acute/structural violence, political/economic refugee and 
good/bad migrant. 
Another pressure that leads to coercion is 
the pressure of performance on counsellors and 
‘voluntary’ return program coordinators –– 
whose performance is mainly measured by the 
number of people they can swiftly remove from 
the host country. Shedding light on this issue, a 
return-counsellor in Germany shared how one 
of her colleagues felt guilty, was severely 
unhappy and left as soon as she was able to get 
another job. This counsellor was about to leave 
the return counselling centre herself and was 
glad that she would leave the [emotional] stress 
behind. Here, I want to argue that ‘voluntary’ 
return can only be a sustainable mode of 
repatriation –– in the eyes of facilitators as well 
as returnees –– when coercion is largely if not 
completely taken out of the equation19. If it is 
used as a last resort on the part of the returnee 
to escape imminent deportation, it is very likely 
to put the voluntariness of ‘voluntary’ returns 
in question. The Choice Scale can help us 
understand how choice or coercion is 
experienced or deployed by the various 
stakeholders of such a form of remigration or 
return.  
 
2. The Information Scale 
The Information Scale can help us understand 
the varying levels of information and 
misinformation that informs a returnee decision 
to return. For example, asylum seekers might 
return due to misinformation when they come 
to believe that their asylum-application stands 
little to no chance –– which in the case of 
Pakistanis might be statistically correct. 
However, that is at best an assumption based on 
a simplified understanding of deservingness 
and it needs to be carefully assessed on an 
individual basis rather than probability. In most 
19 Amongst other things, deportability or fear of 
deportation should not inform an asylum seekers 
decision to return.  
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instances the pressure on counsellors is so 
much that they refuse to listen to the stories of 
their clients. During my observations, the 
counsellors would stop the clients if they tried 
to discuss their asylum case. Their stories and 
asylum applications were irrelevant, they were 
told far too often. Essential information, like 
the asylum seeker’s religious affiliation 
(especially important if the client, or the subject 
of return, belongs to a persecuted minority), 
was ignored. For instance, during one of my 
observations, the counsellor was unaware that 
the client was a Christian, even though it was 
quite evident from his Pakistani Christian 
name.  
The point here is not whether the returnee 
will be in any real danger once he/she is back 
in the country of origin. In most cases, the 
question of safe return20 has already been 
decided upon by the time the asylum seeker 
comes to the return counselling centre. A 
significant number of prospective returnees 
only visit a return counselling centre once all 
other doors have closed –– they are likely to be 
placed on a deportation list if not already on one 
(see ‘The Choice Scale’ above). What I hope to 
inquire here is much more straightforward than 
the principle of nonrefoulement: how likely is 
it that the client (potential returnee) is being 
misinformed by counsellors? With confidence, 
I can assert that such is indeed the case.  
Logic dictates that the information 
required to make a choice should come before 
the action of decision making. Yet, clients in 
the Munich based return counselling centre are 
provided with most of the necessary 
information only after they have agreed to 
return. The counselling session only begins 
once the client has provided the counselling 
centre with their identity documents. Many 
                                                 
20 Legally speaking, and with regards to Pakistani asylum 
seekers, refoulment is generally not an issue. 
clients try to delay that process to get a concrete 
understanding of what they might be getting 
themselves into. However, during such 
counselling sessions, counsellors carefully 
manoeuvre themselves not to provide any 
information that could lead the client to say no 
to the expected ‘voluntary’ return. While 
counsellors see their engagement as ‘open and 
unbiased’, Cleton and Schweitzer’s (2020) 
analysis of ‘voluntary’ return counsellors’ 
strategies resonated with my own. According to 
them, counsellors use one of three strategies to 
induce return upon the rejection of asylum: 
‘Firstly, by identifying existing aspirations [to 
return] among potential returnees […]. 
Secondly, by merely obtaining informed 
consent to return ‘voluntarily’ […]. Thirdly, by 
actively inducing the wish to return […]’ (ibid 
2020). 
All the strategies outlined by Cleton and 
Schweitzer (2020) were observed during my 
fieldwork at the counselling centres in Munich 
and Augsburg, with the second strategy being 
the most practiced. For example, Pakistani 
returnees have to sign a waiver that they will be 
fully responsible for whatever happens to them 
upon return –– especially with regards to legal 
repercussions they may face as a consequence 
of leaving Pakistan through ‘illegal’ means. 
This information is only given to the client once 
they have signed the ‘voluntary’ return consent, 
rather than during the course of the counselling 
session21. At this point, it is quite difficult for 
the prospective returnees to reassess their 
decision to return for various reasons. Firstly, 
due to the absence of a ‘firewall’ between the 
different authorities involved, all the 
information and documentation provided 
during the return counselling session makes it 
harder for the
21 See ‘The Choice Scale’ for the types of pressures on 
counsellors, leading them to use such techniques that I 
would define misinforming.  
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client to re-evaluate the situation, legally 
speaking. At this point, deportability starts to 
play an even more significant role in how the 
subjects of return see themselves. ‘Illegality’ 
and deportation not only seem more probable 
than before, but the clients also happen to be 
constantly reminded about this during the 
counselling session, if they share their 
reservations about returning. Secondly, by this 
time, the clients have likely already informed 
the family that they are returning home22, 
which is likely to desensitise the effects of 
information that discourages return. Thirdly, 
most Pakistani returnees are not only illiterate 
but have little to no understanding of the kind 
of legal consequences they may face upon 
return. To make sure that the clients sign the 
waiver, they are told that it is a mere ‘formality’ 
and no-one has ever landed into any trouble. A 
caveat is sometimes added in the form of a 
light-hearted joke about the possibility of a 
corrupt official demanding a bribe. No effort is 
made to inform the clients about the legal 
consequences, as that may add to their 
reservations. 
Another form of misinformation is the 
miscommunication that mostly occurs due to 
language barriers but also to other kinds of 
cultural misunderstandings and 
mistranslations. During my observations, 
translators rarely spoke the native language23 of 
the client and only spoke very basic Urdu. On 
one occasion, apart from mistranslating, the 
translator started to diagnose a client who 
wished to have a medical check-up before 
departure. ‘You are fine, it’s just stomach gas,’ 
the translator said to the client who had hoped 
to get his abdominal pain checked before his 
prospective return. Although the client was not 
convinced by the translator’s prognosis, the 
                                                 
22 Which may also eliminate the collective familial hope 
of getting legalised in Germany.  
23 Punjabi in most cases. 
translator proceeded to communicate his own 
intuition to the counsellor instead of the client’s 
concerns.  
 
3. The Assistance Scale 
The Assistance Scale helps disentangle 
necessary financial assistance from 
questionable financial inducement that may 
affect the voluntariness of return. As already 
explained above, returnees receive a 
‘reintegration payment’ for returning. In the 
case of my interlocutors, the EU and Germany, 
for the most part, such forms of repatriation are 
funded through various programs. The amount 
can vary depending on the client’s legal and 
application status, whether it is pending or 
processed, accepted or rejected and, it is given 
in various forms: pre-departure cash in 
Germany, post-departure cash in Pakistan, as 
well as in-kind assistance24. Governmental and 
non-governmental partner organisations are 
tasked with carrying out this assistance in 
Germany and Pakistan.  
Firstly, I claim that such payments need to 
be carefully made so that they do not set a bad 
precedent for the moral imperative attached to 
giving refuge. The philosopher Micheal Sandel 
(2012) argues against such an economic 
approach in his book The Moral Limits of 
Markets. Citing a plethora of examples, he 
states that money is not the right tool to tackle 
certain issues. Especially if the issue at hand 
has a moral or social aspect, monetary payment 
should be used with utmost caution as it has the 
propensity to crowd out ethical and social 
responsibilities. In that vein, I argue that 
something such as giving refuge or in this case, 
ensuring reintegration, should be a social 
responsibility rather than a financial obligation. 
Mollie Gerver (2018) makes a slightly different 
24 For example, purchase of assets or stock for a business, 
i.e. not in cash.  
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but equally valid point in her book on the ethics 
of refugee repatriation and argues that such 
payments may reinforce the idea that refugees 
are unwanted members of society –– an idea 
that is already propagated for various political 
reasons.  
Secondly, monetary incentives may be 
counterproductive to reintegration. As such, 
figuring out the right balance between financial 
assistance and inducement is essential. In other 
words, fiscal incentives to the point of 
inducement are not only questionable when it 
comes to determining voluntariness, but can be 
detrimental to well-intentioned reintegration 
support. Like Jamshed, some of my other 
returnee–interlocutors, are already preparing to 
leave Pakistan again after their ‘voluntary’ 
return. In line with Cleton and Schwitzer’s 
observations (2020), my returnee interlocutors 
did not want to return but were coerced, 
misinformed and or induced into taking that 
decision. Hence, most of them want to leave 
again and they will probably do so through the 
very high-risk irregular means that the 
reintegration support is supposed to 
discourage! 
 
Conclusions 
Deportations and repatriations (whether 
involuntary or ‘voluntary’) have a chequered 
history in Germany. At times, the removal, 
even extinction of the ‘undeserving’, has been 
legitimised based on nationhood or religion. At 
other times it was based on a differentiation 
between the economic and the political 
refugee25. The politics of removal in Germany 
point to a constant negotiation between 
competing political, economic and social 
forces. In this process, it seems that the refugee 
                                                 
25 Often founded upon ideas of deservingness. 
26 Most of whom have a job and contribute to the German 
economy.  
or the migrant Other lacks any real agency or 
choice.  
The recent German law which makes it 
easier for companies to hire skilled labour from 
outside Europe is a reflection of this 
negotiation. While the law aims to boost 
Germany’s economy through an injection of 
foreign labour, it simultaneously incorporates 
obstacles to prevent economic refugees from 
using the German asylum system as a 
backdoor. One would assume that the reason 
would be to deter economic refugees as they 
might take the place of more ‘deserving’ 
political refugees, but it is more likely that such 
measures are intended to counter challenges 
posed by right-wing parties like the AfD. This 
is not the first time that economic refugees and 
migrants are portrayed as chancers and 
scroungers threatening German prosperity and 
resources (see Stokes 2019). Amongst others, 
people affected by such discourses are Afghans 
and Pakistanis26.  
In the text above, I tried to show how a 
newcomer’s time in Germany is marked by 
differences and lack of agency in the process of 
integration. Rather than being seen as a 
newcomer, the person is seen as an asylum 
seeker, an economic or political refugee, a 
migrant worker, an undocumented/irregular 
migrant or through another category that 
defines his/her legal status and rights. The legal 
status, in turn, structures their respective 
deportability and insecurities –– affecting their 
choices and agency with regards to their 
potential and actual return (or removal)27. This 
leaves ample room for a social-responsibility-
based debate about mobility and migration.  
For the purpose of this paper, I tried to 
problematise the process of removal and in 
particular the so-called ‘voluntary’ returns.  I
27 In addition to the example of Hassam A. above, see the 
instance of Asif N. provided by Sökefeld (2019b). 
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took three rather simple concerns and placed 
each of these concerns on a scale with two 
opposing factors. The difference in the two 
factors of each scale, I argue, can help in 
assessing the voluntariness of return. 
Moreover, the scales make visible certain 
practices of ‘voluntary’ return that are integral 
to understanding a form of repatriation that is 
being advocated as a sustainable and ethical 
alternative to unethical deportations. Using 
examples from my fieldwork and the 
perspectives of my interlocutors, I first 
addressed what I called the Choice Scale by 
characterising the difference between choice 
and coercion in the decision to return. The 
second scale, namely the Information Scale, 
grappled with the issue of information versus 
misinformation. The third scale looked at the 
subtle but vital difference between financial 
assistance and inducement and it is hence called 
the Assistance Scale. As the names suggest, 
each of these scales points to a problematic 
situation that needs to be addressed if returning 
countries like Germany28 are really interested 
in voluntary remigration of rejected asylum 
seekers (for a discussion and examples see 
Christides et al. 2020, Mahar 2020b, a). A 
critical assessment of ‘voluntary’ returns 
keeping in mind the levels of coercion, 
information and assistance will not only help 
make such forms of repatriation and 
remigration more voluntary and sustainable29 
but should be the only way to proceed with 
them if at all. 
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